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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In cyber security, engineers need to devise ways to protect their systems from hackers. 
One of the ways that they do this is through intrusion detection. Host based intrusion 
detection systems reside on the computer and perform internal diagnostics of a 
computer to detect malware and misuse. These HIDS use a variety of methods to 
detect and prevent attacks such as file integrity verification, log monitoring, file access 
patterns and etc. In this thesis, we look at the method of analyzing system calls for 
anomalous behavior.  
Programs use system calls to gain access to functions from an operating 
systems kernel. Therefore, it is theoretically possible to detect when a hacker may be 
exploiting a program by analyzing system call patterns of an application. However, 
despite previous work in this area, there remain many challenges to accurately 
detecting malicious exploits and intruders through system call analysis which have 
prevented it from being used in real systems. 
To help bridge the gap and address the challenges in making system call 
analysis a reality, we introduce a new method of system call analysis that we call the 
Triple Pot method. Our method utilizes three computers running concurrently on the 
same network to check for anomalous behavior of an application. The key idea is that 
by setting up a staged, fake network of computers we can get the hacker to identify their 
exploit for us. We will show how our method can be used to automatically identify zero 
day attacks that could not previously have been detected using previous system call 
analysis methods. 
In addition, we also introduce a method to aggregate and analyze system calls 
from distributed machines to use information from multiple computers to detect zero day 
attacks. We do this by creating a probabilistic model of the networked computer 
systems to determine the likelihood that an application is exhibiting anomalous behavior 
that is caused by a malicious hacker. Our methods can accurately locate malicious 
behavior with low false positives. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Today’s hackers continually explore and develop new methods to perform cyber attacks 
on systems. With the rise of the personal computer in almost every home in the world, 
cyber attacks can be done by anyone from script kiddies to large rival enterprise 
corporations. An entire economy has been developed on the black market in which 
people may discover and sell new computer exploits to the highest bidder[1]. Bidders for 
cyber warfare technology encourage increased cyber activity that has the potential to be 
good or bad. Corporations may even try to procure these exploits to glean data from 
rival competitors which helps them obtain corporate strategies and technical products.   
 A cyber attack usually occurs in two stages: exploit stage and payload stage. An 
exploit in an application may incorporate the use of a backdoor password, a buffer 
overflow attack, a SQL injection attack, and many other methods. The exploit is used by 
hackers to attempt to gain access to a remote computer. If the exploit stage is 
successful, a hacker may then move onto the payload stage. In this stage, hackers take 
advantage of the access given to them by the exploit to try to steal information from the 
computer or damage the system for the user. An example would be the Meterpreter 
module on the Metasploit software, which allows people to send a variety of commands 
to a remote computer to do malicious activity. 
 One of the most dangerous threats to corporations is the Advanced Persistent 
Threat[2]. This is a threat where an entity continually targets a specific corporation for 
cyber hacking. An example may be a rival corporation trying to learn secrets from its 
competitor. This threat is different from more common cyber threats because most 
cyber threats do not target a specific individual, but rather spread across the web trying 
to acquire whatever it can get such as botnets trying to harness cpu power. APT is 
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different because it is done by some competitive rival trying to gain an unfair advantage. 
These are the types of entities that employ zero day attack methods so that they can 
undermine their opponent’s defenses with an unknown exploit. The vast majority of 
cyber defense is signature based. Companies are dependent on attacks being identified 
and then pushed into the database for detection. However, entities that try to 
persistently attack another entity will want to evade detection from signature scanners. 
Thus, they will use zero day attacks that nobody knows about yet to try to get into their 
enemies systems. These are the attacks that our system tries to counter against. 
 Most exploits do happen at the application layer, either through some sort of a 
buffer overflow attack or some other unusual program exploit. Consequentially, traces of 
the attack can be recorded through the system calls that the application sends to the 
operating system kernel. Applications make heavy use of system calls and thus we can 
build a profile of an application and record the system calls used in everyday operation 
of the system. A profile of an application consists of the normal, safe operations that an 
app can perform on a regular basis. 
 The system that we propose to use to analyze system calls is a distributed 
system meant to simulate the conditions of a real enterprise server running on a 
network. These servers are used to communicate with the rest of the internet and are 
assumed to have network connectivity. We call our model, The Triple Pot model 
because it involves the simultaneous use of three computers that may be either virtual 
or physical machines. For our purposes, we use three virtual machines to simulate the 
three pots. One pot is the real server doing real work with the outside world, while the 
other two pots are there to record suspicious activity for security purposes. By creating 
three different systems, we can better identify suspicious system call behavior on the 
applications running on the machines. We do penetration testing on our system model 
by throwing exploits at it to test its detection performance. We find that our system is 
able to reliably detect new attacks with low false positives, making it more practical for 
real systems than previous approaches that only analyzed system calls in isolation to 
one machine. Even without a database known signatures, our system is able to identify 
a malicious attack as it occurs without prior knowledge of how the attack works. 
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Furthermore, our method does this while preserving the privacy of each machine 
activities. 
 Secondly, we also look at the case when multiple computers may collaborate to 
share security details. We notice that for the case of advanced persistent threats, 
computers on the same network are likely to be compromised together. Moreover, 
computers on a completely different network are unlikely to be compromised as the 
targeted entity. This is because attackers do not want to draw too much attention to 
their exploit because they want to be able to use it to only target specific entities without 
being discovered. Therefore, networks that are not on the hit list are unlikely to exhibit 
the same anomalous system call patterns that a particular zero day exploit may cause. 
As such, we develop a probabilistic model to calculate the likelihood that a computer 
has been infected with a zero day exploit by examining its system calls and the system 
calls of other computers running the same application.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 RELATED WORK 
 
 
 
Host based intrusion detection has been a field with potential that hasn’t quite yet 
bridged the gulf between research and practice. It is far more common to see 
companies in industry install network based intrusion detection systems or virus 
scanners instead. However, despite HIDS’ status as a niche application in the field of 
computer security, there has been progress in research for developing ways to have 
practical systems employ HIDS monitoring. 
 
2.1 System Log Approach to Host-Based Intrusion Detection 
 
Many of the proposed approaches to HIDS involve monitoring things like CPU usage, 
system logs, access patterns. For example, Lichdodzijewski et al looked at using self-
organizing maps to detect anomalous logins. SOM is an unsupervised learning 
technique for data analysis that uses artificial neural networks[3]. In another instance 
Kola et al explored the use of SOM for analyzing cpu usage and disk usage[4]. They 
claimed that SOM was more stable than clustering algorithms like k-means because it 
required less predefined user variables that could change greatly depending on the 
situation. In these cases, they looked at the security of linux operating systems. 
 For Windows, researchers like Topallar et al looked at using SOM to analyze 
patterns in windows registry access[5]. In addition Stolfo et all explored the 
effectiveness of two different anomaly detection algorithms PAD and SVM on Windows 
registry behavior[6]. They claimed that the PAD method could outperform traditional 
SVM methods at a lower complexity cost. 
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 People have also looked at the Basic Security Model audit records which used to 
be created by Sun. These BSM records provided improved security features over 
standard UNIX operating systems. Koral et al explored the use of state transition 
analysis to record and detect penetrations by modeling them as a series of state 
changes from an initial secure state to a target compromised state[7]. They claimed that 
their method was more flexible in detecting penetration attacks by considering how 
actions on the computer change the state rather than just looking for duplicate actions 
like in signature scanning based methods. Peng et al used similar techniques to create 
workflow diagrams to identify signatures of attacks[8]. Later on, Anup et al also 
examined how to monitor BSM logs for anomalies and they proposed building a profile 
of the system using back propagation neural networks or elman networks to learn the 
past behavior[9]. If a future behavior deviated too much from the past, it would be 
considered potentially malicious. 
 The issue with these prior methods is that they mainly work on monitoring 
systems at an abstract level. They view the logs of the system which do not contain fine 
grained application activity. Also, they cannot isolate how or which application was 
exploited. Instead these methods mainly look at detecting computers that are being 
misused after exploitation. They do not detect the exploit itself. Instead they take a more 
lightweight approach and check logs which only get updated infrequently. Security 
professionals usually want to know how their computer was hacked and not just that it 
was hacked. By the time these methods detect malicious behavior, the hackers would 
have already done their damage by moving files or corrupting the computer. In some of 
these papers, researchers stated that they wanted to keep the workload light so that the 
CPU would not be strained running a security program in the background. However, we 
are interested in enterprise level security and believe that computers are starting to get 
faster with more and more cores. We believe that increased processor performance can 
lead to more insightful security applications.  
Our goal is to expand the scope of the monitoring system and scan the actual 
application activity. More importantly, we want to be able to detect an exploit as soon as 
possible, so the security monitor can be notified of any possible intrusions that take 
place to mitigate the damage before anything happens.  
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2.2 System Call Approach to Host-Based Intrusion Detection 
 
System calls are used by applications to interact with the operating system and the files 
on it. They may be used to open up a file or send data through a port. By monitoring 
system calls, one can obtain a fine grained model of application activity. 
 Hofmeyr, Forrest, and Somayaji looked at detecting intrusions through system 
call analysis[10]. To do this, they calculated the hamming distance on system call 
commands and used a sliding window approach to gather short sequences of system 
calls. They build up a profile of normal behavior from the program of interest and then 
measure the “Hamming distance” from a new trace to the traces in the profile. If a trace 
is too different than it is considered anomalous and potentially malicious. Gaurav also 
looked at using machine learning to analyze system calls. He used not just the system 
call method, but the argument to the method when logging the activity of the 
application[11].  
 Liu et al also explored system call based intrusion detection by looking at it with 
protocol context[12]. They combined both the control flow of the program activity with 
the data flow of the program. The control flow refers to the system calls while the data 
refers to the system arguments. They call their approach, the semantic flow model, and 
they tried to create unique traces of a program that they called semantic units where a 
semantic unit describes one aspect of a program’s behavior. 
 Gideon and Hu similarly investigated using the semantic approach for using 
contiguous and discontiguous system call patterns[13]. They analyzed their traces using 
an extreme learning machine to create an artificial neural network to detect anomalous 
traces. 
 Sekar et al proposed to use a finite-state automation mechanism to detect 
malicious behavior from applications[14]. They believed that their method avoided the 
more machine learning heavy computations of other approaches by using an efficient 
FSA method that required less space and constant time per system call during the 
learning and detection phase. 
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 Most of these methods assumed a window size of size 6 to handle the straces, 
but this may not be optimal. Eskin, Lee, and Stolfo explored using entropy based 
methods to find optimal window sizes to gather system call sequences [15].  
Wagner and Soto looked at how to counter system call analysis by developing 
what they call a mimicry attack which takes advantage of the fact that some of the 
proposed system call analysis relies heavily on matching sequences of calls[16]. They 
noticed that it was possible to create a program which mimicked the actual system calls 
of an application and thus mask their malicious app. 
So far, most of the papers on system call analysis that we surveyed used a 
single computer to perform the analysis. They do not take into account how multiple 
computers may be used to enhance anomaly detection. Our approach is different in that 
we leverage multiple computers to enhance anomaly detection in a way that a single 
computer could not possibly do. While there has been some previous work in dealing 
with distributed network systems, they mostly dealt with network data[17][18][19]. They 
used peer to peer systems to aggregate data and applied tactics such as ant colony 
optimization algorithms or information theoretic approaches to crunch the data. Our 
methods instead look at the fine grained system calls of each application to determine 
how similar or dissimilar they are with applications running on other machines. We 
believe that utilizing a distributed system where computers share specific information 
with each other can improve detection of anomalous behavior and reduce false 
positives in a manner not possible with standard single computer HIDS. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 SYSTEM CALL TRACING OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
Applications may use system calls from everything from reading the time to opening a 
file. In addition processes may spawn child processes that also have system calls. 
When someone tries to exploit an application to create a new terminal, that new 
terminal is still considered a child process of the original application, which means we 
can still capture a malicious hacker’s activity and trace it back to its source. We use the 
strace program found in Ubuntu to capture system call traces. 
 Previous research on system calls used metrics such as Hamming distance or 
SVM to compare traces. In our method we use Levenschtein distance which takes into 
account the edit operations of insertion, deletion, and substitution. We implement it 
using the Wagner-Fischer method which is a dynamic programming algorithm. With this 
method, we are able to calculate the edit distance between sequences of system calls. 
We define a sequence of systems calls to be 7 consecutive system calls. We also 
define a trace to be multiple consecutive sequences that may represent an action such 
an exploit. In our experiments we capture the system calls by using the program id of 
the application. We also capture any child processes that are spawned from the original 
process. 
 Many of the previous system call metrics tried to detect anomalies by believing 
that traces from exploits were significantly different than regular traces. They thought 
that there would be a big edit distance difference. This is why machine learning 
approaches were used to try to detect the relationship between system calls to 
determine the likelihood that a sequence was malicious or not.  
 However, we believe that this assumption is not valid because hackers can 
develop exploits that are very similar to normal sequences of system calls. An exploit 
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does not need to have any special properties for a malicious hacker to use. Therefore, 
any supervised learning approach to detect exploits may not be very effective as there 
is little in common between exploits of different applications. There are so many ways 
an exploit can be created, that it is not really feasible to be able to read a sequence and 
identify it as a malicious with no other data to support it. Also, if there are about 100 
possible potential system call commands and seven spots for a system call, then there 
are over trillions of possible system call sequences. This means that different 
applications often have very different profiles from one another. One cannot train on one 
application and then use that behavior to extrapolate results from other applications. 
This creates problems in that every application needs to build their own behavioral 
profile. Currently, application developers do not provide these behavioral profiles 
themselves. This is one major reason, why system call anomaly detection methods 
have not seen wide use in the industry yet. Much of what we will see later on is how to 
leverage additional data besides just the sequence of system calls to determine whether 
a trace is malicious or not.  
 The methods we explore in this paper are based more on creating dictionaries of 
sequences and then finding matches among different dictionaries to leverage the 
additional information of multiple computers. 
 
 
 
  
10 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 THE TRIPLE POT METHOD 
 
 
4.1 Assumptions and Design Methodology 
 
The Triple Pot method utilizes three computers that are on the same network. It makes 
certain assumptions about the scenario in which this method is utilized. These 
assumptions are built off the premise that we are interested in the situation where an 
enterprise server that communicates online with users may be subject to an Advanced 
Persistent Threat from another entity. Such an adversary would probably be considered 
to have a high level of resources and professional aptitude. As such, they would be 
utilizing a zero day exploit that they either purchase on the black market or develop in 
house.  
For our scenario, we do not handle the case of the more common hacker who would 
utilize cybercrime exploits that are well known. Hackers such as script kiddies usually 
take exploits from common malware libraries and attempt to hack into outdated 
computers that do not have patches to protect against such exploits. We assume that 
our enterprise level server has the requisite patches against known attacks and also 
has a scanner which can detect exploits from a database of previous exploits. 
Instead, we focus on identifying zero-day attacks that use exploits that nobody is 
aware of yet. It is believed that these types of exploits may be used for months to 
penetrate computer defenses before anybody becomes aware. For corporations, these 
zero-day attacks are the toughest to guard against as most malware detection relies on 
scanning for signatures of known attacks. Since a zero-day attack is not known, 
traditional cyber defenses cannot reliably protect against these exploits.  
Host-based intrusion detection systems that utilize novel anomaly based detection 
methods may have a chance of detecting when an attack is occurring. However, their 
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usefulness in real life situations has been hampered for a variety of reasons. First, these 
systems usually rely on a robust and complete profile of the application’s behavior to be 
built. These profiles are needed to determine when an application’s new behavior does 
not match the past history of the application. A major issue with this is that it is 
extremely difficult to generate these profiles for an application because an application 
may have millions of different paths that it could take. All one can really hope for is a 
profile that covers as many paths as possible, but it will usually be difficult to cover all 
the paths. As such, it is not practically feasible for prior methods that utilize application 
profiles as baselines to distinguish anomalous behavior to be effective. These methods 
to detect anomalies suffer from the problem of proclaiming all new activity to be 
malicious. 
Our system is different in that while it still uses a behavioral profile of the application 
to detect anomalies, it has an improved mechanism for distinguishing malicious 
anomalous behavior from benign anomalous behavior. By harnessing 2 other 
computers running the same application, we can examine their behavior to determine if 
our own computer is running malicious software. This is possible because we take 
advantage of our knowledge on the attack patterns of malicious hackers. Frankly, we 
rely on the key assumption that an adversary acts with little knowledge of the internal 
networking of an organization’s servers and the organization of the data within the 
organization. As such, they will adopt a strategy of port scanning all computers on the 
internal network that they can reach and then executing an attack on ones that have the 
specified weakness.  
 
Assumption: Adversary scans network and attempts to attack all vulnerable 
computers 
 By setting up two additional fake computers next to our real computer, we can 
set up a trap that can give us additional information about hacks from competitors. 
Instead of one instance of the exploit, we will have 2 instances of the exploit and 2 
sequences of illegitimate sequences of system calls to inspect. Since we already know 
for sure that the fake computers aren’t supposed to be running any new behaviors 
because we set them up ourselves, we know that any anomalous behavior from our 
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fake computer must be from an outside malicious entity. By comparing traces from the 
fake computer to the real computer, we can tell if a sequence of system calls is 
malicious or not. Anomalous malicious system calls would be the same on both the real 
computer and the fake computer. Anomalous benign system calls would appear on the 
real computer, but not the fake computer.  
The reason why we utilize a third computer is to establish a third computer that 
doesn’t have access to the network to be remotely exploited. This computer could not 
possibly display any malicious behavior because it is not even connected. We assume 
that the hacker does not have physical access to the servers and is trying to attack 
remotely over the network. The role of the third computer is to act as a profile of the 
normal background processes that an application may execute. Applications may have 
background processes running that may be deemed unusual. Furthermore, many 
applications have built in schedules to perform some action at a certain time. This may 
be behavior such as a server defragmenting its hard drive or cleaning up memory 
space. It may also be periodically sending out notifications of system events. We have 
also seen applications constantly attempting to poll network queues for data. However, 
if our third computer only creates benign processes, then we have an additional 
dictionary of safe sequences to compare to the other sequences on the other machines. 
If a sequence from the other real machines matches a sequence from the dictionary 
created from the benign machine, then we know to classify that sequence as safe. 
In our model, we have three computers and one monitoring center. The first 
computer is called the ACC(Active Computer Connected to network) and this computer 
is the real computer being monitored that does actual processing for the enterprise. The 
second computer is called the PCC(Passive Computer Connected) and this computer is 
a fake computer meant to serve as a trap to catch malicious behavior. The third 
computer is called the PCD(Passive Computer Disconnected) and this computer is a 
fake computer that is not connected to the internet. It is meant to check processes from 
the ACC and PCC to classify healthy sequences. These three computers, ACC, PCC, 
and PCD are connected to a monitoring center that can collect information from the 
three computers to make a decision on whether the active computer has a malicious 
sequence or not. By creating a third monitoring center, we can offload some of the 
 heavy processing from the ACC
efficient on the computer of interest.
4.2 Algorithm 
 
The algorithm to that we utilize to combine system calls from the ACC, PCC, and PCD 
is efficient. First, it involves creating five types of logs. These logs are used to compare 
and contrast different traces found in the Triple Pot system. These logs are sy
traces from Ubuntu that we acquired by setting up virtual machines. The system calls 
can be recorded using the strace application.
The first log is the normal behavioral profile of the ACC. This log can be built 
from running the system in an isol
traces of the computer. This is considered to be the safe log and any future traces that 
match up with traces in the normal behavioral profile are considered to be safe. We can 
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 to another computer to make the CPU processing more 
  
Figure 4.1: Triple Pot Monitoring 
 
ated and safe network and then recording system call 
 
stem call 
 
 create what we call a dictionary of safe traces from this log by using a sliding window of 
size W. This size W can be modified or changed depending on the circumstances. For 
our purposes, we use a window size of 7.
 The next log that we will discus
traces of the PCC. The system calls on the PCC should be almost nonexistent because 
it is a fake computer not running any actual user activity. If someone from the outside 
tries to access it, then we assu
14 
Figure 4.2: The Triple Pot  
 
 
s is the Type 4 log. This log is of the system call 
me that they are a malicious hacker trying to get into any 
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computer it can find. If we capture any suspicious traces from Type 4 logs, we can 
compare it to the logs from the ACC to see if there are any matches, in which case we 
can flag those as malicious too. 
 The Type 5 log is generated from the PCD, and it is a log of all the background 
processes that may spawn from an application. This is to take into account any periodic 
updating that a system may try to do. It also tells us what processes should be running 
on the PCC that are not normally run in the background. 
 For testing purposes, we also have a Type 2 and Type 3 which are logs of the 
PCC in normal use. The Type 2 logs contain exploits of the application under 
consideration. The Type 3 logs contain the operation under normal use, but also having 
new operations not featured in the profile. This is to show how our system can 
distinguish anomalous traces that come from exploits and anomalous traces that are 
just new behaviors not featured in the normal behavioral profile. 
 Our algorithm is divided into 3 main stages P1, P2, and P3. P1 can be done 
entirely in the ACC. P2 and P3 can be done by the central monitoring center. In these 
stages, we divide an strace of system logs by using a sliding window of size 7. So each 
sequence is made up of 7 system calls. Also, since we cannot know when a sequence 
for a command begins or ends, we create a dictionary of all possible sequences. So the 
window slides by 1 every time, instead of by 7. In this way if there are 70 system calls, a 
dictionary can be formed with size 63 of the total possible patterns, which is N(num of 
system calls) – W(window size). 
 In P1, we find anomalous traces of system calls on the active computer that are 
not found in the profile dictionary. In P2, we find anomalous traces of system calls on 
the fake computer that are not found in the profile dictionary or background processes 
dictionary. In P3, we combine the results of P1 and P2 to see if there are any matches 
between them. If there are a high number of matches then we would consider there to 
be an exploit.  
 To help detect Mimicry attacks, we would also check in P2, whether there are an 
unusually high number of anomalous traces in the PCC that are not in the background 
processes, but are matched up with the profile of the normal behavior of the ACC. 
These traces would be considered suspicious even if they match up with the normal 
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behavior of the ACC because the PCC shouldn’t have any behavior running on it at all 
because it is a fake dummy computer. Only a hacker would be running a normal 
process on it. Mimicry attacks are when a hacker tries to imitate the normal system call 
behavior of an app while still performing malicious acts. Our system can thus detect 
Mimicry attacks in a way that previous systems could not. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Triple Pot Algorithm 
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P1 ALGORITHM PSEUDOCODE 
 
static ArrayList<String> P1(String file1, String file2){ 
  try { 
   int threshold = 1; 
 
   ArrayList<String> lines = lines from Type 1 log; 
  
   //create dictionary of patterns for Type 1 log 
   ArrayList<String> patterns = new ArrayList<String>(); 
   HashSet<String> unset = new HashSet<String>(); 
   Sequence curp 
    
   for(int i=0; i < lines.size()-wsize; i++){ 
    for(int j=i; j < i+ wsize; j++){ 
     curp.add(lines.get(j)); 
    }    
    if(unset.add(curp)){ 
     patterns.add(curp); 
    } 
    curp.clear(); 
   } 
 
   HashMap<String, Integer> tc = new HashMap<String, 
Integer>(); 
   ArrayList<String> lines2 = lines from Type 2 log; 
   
   //create list of patterns of Type 2 log 
   ArrayList<String> patterns2 = new ArrayList<String>(); 
     
   for(int i=0; i < lines2.size()-wsize; i = i + wsize){ 
    for(int j=i; j < i+ wsize; j++){ 
     curp.add(lines.get(j)); 
    } 
    patterns2.add(curp); 
    curp.clear() 
   } 
    
   int min = 0; 
   ArrayList<String> p1 = new ArrayList<String>(); 
 
         for(int i=0; i < patterns2.size(); i++){ 
          String[] foo = patterns2.get(i); 
          min = 1000; 
          for(int j =0; j < patterns.size(); j++){ 
           String[] bar = patterns.get(j); 
           int ret = EditDistance(foo, bar); 
           if(ret < min){ 
            min = ret; 
           } 
          } 
           
          if(min >= threshold){ 
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           p1.add(patterns2.get(i)); 
          } 
         } 
 
         return p1; 
  } 
  catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
   
  return null; 
 } 
 
 
P2 ALGORITHM PSEUDOCODE 
 
static ArrayList<String> t4vt5t1(String file4, String file5,String file1){ 
  try { 
   int threshold = 1; 
 
   ArrayList<String> lines = lines from Type 5 log 
 
   //create dictionary of patterns for Type 5 
   ArrayList<String> patterns5 = new ArrayList<String>(); 
   HashSet<String> unset = new HashSet<String>(); 
    
   for(int i=0; i < lines.size()-wsize; i++){ 
    for(int j=i; j < i+ wsize; j++){ 
     curp.add(lines.get(j)); 
    } 
     
    if(unset.add(curp)){ 
     patterns5.add(curp); 
    } 
    curp.clear(); 
   } 
 
   ArrayList<String> lines2 = lines from Type 4 log 
    
   //create dictionary of patterns for Type 4 
   ArrayList<String> patterns4 = new ArrayList<String>(); 
   HashSet<String> unset2 = new HashSet<String>(); 
   HashMap<String, Integer> tc = new HashMap<String, 
Integer>(); 
    
   for(int i=0; i < lines2.size()-wsize; i++){ 
    for(int j=i; j < i+ wsize; j++){ 
     curp.add(lines2.get(j)); 
    } 
     
    if(unset2.add(curp)){ 
     patterns4.add(curp); 
    } 
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    curp.clear(); 
   } 
    
   ArrayList<String> lines3 = lines from Type 3 log 
      
   //create dictionary of patterns for Type 3 
   ArrayList<String> patterns1 = new ArrayList<String>(); 
   HashSet<String> unset3 = new HashSet<String>(); 
    
   for(int i=0; i < lines3.size()-wsize; i++){ 
    for(int j=i; j < i+ wsize; j++){ 
     curp.add(lines3.get(j)); 
    } 
     
    if(unset3.add(curp)){ 
     patterns1.add(curp); 
    } 
 
    curp.clear(); 
   } 
      
   //compare Type 4 dictionary with Type 5 and Type 1 to 
find p2 dictionary 
   ArrayList<String> qdict = new ArrayList<String>(); 
   ArrayList<String> rdict = new ArrayList<String>(); 
   int min = 0; 
         for(int i=0; i < patterns4.size(); i++){ 
          String[] foo = patterns4.get(i); 
          min = 1000; 
          for(int j =0; j < patterns5.size(); j++){ 
           String[] bar = patterns5.get(j); 
           int ret = EditDistance(foo, bar); 
           if(ret < min){ 
            min = ret; 
           } 
          } 
           
          if(min >= threshold){   
           int min2 = 1000; 
           for(int k=0; k < patterns1.size(); k++){ 
            String[] bar = patterns1.get(k); 
            int ret = EditDistance(foo, bar); 
            if(ret < min2){ 
             min2 = ret; 
            } 
           } 
            
           if(min2 < threshold){ 
            rdict.add(patterns4.get(i)); 
           } 
           else{ 
            qdict.add(patterns4.get(i)); 
           } 
          } 
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         } 
         
          
         return qdict; 
  } 
  catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
  return null; 
 } 
 
 
P3 ALGORITHM PSEUDOCODE 
 
public static void P3() { 
   
 Initialize files 
 String file1  
 String file2  
 String file4  
 String file5 
 
 ArrayList<String> p1 = t1vt2(file1, file2);  
  
 ArrayList<String> p2 = t4vt5t1(file4, file5,file1); 
   
 int min = 0; 
 int threshold = 0; 
 int dups = 0; 
 ArrayList<String> attackmatches = new ArrayList<String>(); 
 
        for(int i=0; i < p1.size(); i++){ 
         String[] foo = p1.get(i); 
         min = 1000; 
         for(int j =0; j < p2.size(); j++){ 
          String[] bar = p2.get(j); 
          int ret = EditDistance(foo, bar); 
          if(ret < min){ 
           min = ret; 
          } 
         } 
          
         if(min <= threshold){ 
          attackmatches.add(p1.get(i)); 
         } 
        }  
} 
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4.3 Experimental Trials 
 
For our experiments, we looked at using data from five applications that we exploited. 
We used exploits in Unreal, Samba, Vsftpd, Tomcat server, and MySql. We wanted to 
see if our program would be able to detect attacks on these applications. To conduct 
our simulations we set up virtual machines and ran a virtual network. Then we recorded 
the system calls of the applications to create profiles during normal use. After that, we 
began running exploits on the applications to see if our anomaly detection methods 
would discover them. We found that it was always able to detect the attacks that we 
conducted on it with low false positive rate. It seems exploits will frequently cause 
system calls to be anomalous in a manner that can be detected. Exploits on 
applications like Tomcat could cause 796 anomalous sequences of size 7 to be 
detected. However, the range in terms of the size of anomalous traces caused by 
exploits could vary greatly. For example, in VSFTPD, it only took 40 anomalous traces 
for an exploit to succeed. This shows that predetermining a threshold to indicate 
whether a run of system calls is malicious or not may be difficult because an exploit may 
succeed with many system calls or few system calls. However, it also seems that very 
few system calls will be declared as anomalously malicious in our system if they are 
indeed benign. We ran multiple cases of new behavior to determine if our algorithm 
would correctly determine that the new behavior was healthy or not. New safe behavior 
that was not seen in the original behavioral profile of ACC, would be classified as 
healthy in our system due to the comparison checks with the PCC that our method 
employs. Therefore, we do indeed see that our system does a good job in distinguishing 
new, healthy behavior from new malicious behavior. Even with an incomplete behavioral 
profile of an application, we could still determine whether a sequence of system calls 
was malicious which is something that prior methods could not do. 
 Our virtual computers that we used to simulate the ACC, PCC, and PCD were 
using the Ubuntu 8.04 versoin running previous versions of these exploits. They were 
running on Intel processors with core i5 processors using 2GB memory for each VM 
and regular hard drive space.  
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Table 4.1: Discovering Exploits in Applications 
Application Anomalous 
matches 
form exploit 
Anomalous 
matches 
from new 
behavior 
Case #1 
Anomalous 
matches 
from new 
behavior 
Case #2 
Anomalous 
matches 
from new 
behavior 
Case #3 
Anomalous 
matches 
from new 
behavior 
Case #4 
Anomalous 
matches 
from new 
behavior 
Case #5 
Unreal 179 0 0 0 0 0 
Samba 46 8 0 6 6 6 
Vsftpd 40 0 0 0 0 0 
Tomcat 796 3 4 127 8 8 
MySql 172 4 0 14 5 na 
 
4.4  Privacy 
 
Our method was designed to also preserve the privacy of an application. Only the 
computer running the application knows the system calls that the application runs 
because only anomalous system calls are sent to the monitoring center. Therefore, the 
privacy of the ACC is not compromised. We explored other methods of analysis, mainly 
sending all files to the central monitoring service, but we thought that might hinder 
privacy of the computer by leaking details of its operation to the network. If we can avoid 
this issue when possible, it would be ideal. However, if one does not care about privacy, 
they could potentially offload all the files and computations to the central monitor. This 
would alleviate the CPU burden on the server of running the anomaly detection scans of 
the normal behavioral profile. A server may be running multiple applications so a 
different anomaly scanner would need to be created for each application. We noticed 
that some applications create thousands of system calls a second and handling all 
these logs could be unwieldy. If an enterprise server handles a large amount of 
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requests from online users that could overload the anomaly detection algorithm in P1, 
then an alternative might be to send the logs to another computer, either hosted on the 
same rack to avoid leaking information to the network or possibly sent to the network if 
one does not have sensitive data and is just trying to prevent its computers from being 
misused for botnets. 
4.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have seen The Triple Pot model and discussed how it works, the 
assumptions made, and the cases when it can be applied. We showed that our 
experiments verified the effectiveness of The Triple Pot model on real exploits running 
on real applications. We were able to achieve strong performance despite not using a 
complete behavioral profile of an application. We could detect anomalous behavior and 
then determine whether it was malicious or benign. In this way, we could greatly reduce 
the number of false positives that would normally swarm a security operator running 
system call analysis using previous methods. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM CALL ANALYSIS 
 
 
5.1 Assumptions and Use Case 
 
This section covers a probabilistic model of how a network of computers running system 
call monitoring software could aggregate their data to be utilized to find zero day 
exploits. This would involve multiple networks from different organizations sharing their 
data together. This model is not related to The Triple Pot model above. It is a separate 
model dealing with the case where an organization may have multiple computers on a 
network. There may be other organizations running the same program in a different 
location. For security purposes, they may want to share their system call logs with a 
secure third party monitoring center. Anyone who has used computers has probably 
encountered messages when an application crashes, asking whether they want to send 
logs to the application’s company to help debug the problem. This is a common 
scenario used by companies developing applications. In our case, instead of sending 
logs, we want to send the system call activity. The system call activity is obviously more 
extensive and fine grained than a regular error log. In this way, it can potentially be a 
bigger drain on CPU usage and network bandwidth. However, for system that require 
high assurance of security, there may be a necessary need to undertake distributed 
system call analysis. 
 In order for it to be possible to aggregate data from multiple organizations, there 
needs to exist a trusted third party that people will not mind sending their data to. This 
third party would have to agree to keep all system call activity confidential and not to 
reveal anything to anybody. We believe that if multiple organizations share their system 
call activity, that it would be possible to enhance security by making it easier to identify 
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zero day exploits. The third party could compare traces and see which ones match and 
which ones did not match with anybody else’s traces. 
 Although different organizations may have different data used for each 
application, the application’s function still remain the same. The system calls record the 
functions of the application and it is not necessary for us to rely computers sharing the 
same data. Computers just need to share the same application and perform similar 
functions to get the same system traces. For example, the save button on an app 
should produce the same sequence of system calls regardless of what data actually 
gets saved. System calls have two main attributes, the call itself and the data that the 
call handles. Different organizations should share the same call functions, but just with 
different data handled in the argument list for those calls. We mainly focus on the 
system call functions and not the system call arguments used.  
5.2 Internal Network Analysis 
  
 The first thing we may want to consider is the internal network of computers in an 
organization. An organization may have dozens of servers running identical programs. 
We assume that there is a dedicated central monitoring application for each network. 
This dedicated central monitoring center would be able to collect the relevant data from 
all the computers in the internal network to see which applications run on which 
computers. All the computers running an instance of the same application would be 
categorized together. This model does not use any dummy computers, but rather 
focuses on the use case where a company wants to see if any information can be 
gleaned from the system call activity of just the real computers alone. Once again, we 
make the assumption that any malicious hacker would scan  a network for all vulnerable 
computers. Then, they would try to hack into as many computers as possible. If we 
know what the hacker is trying to do, then we can build a model around it.  
  First, we want to believe if a hacker has a list of vulnerable computers, there are 
two ways he could go about attacking them. First, he could manually attack them one by 
one by himself. Second, he could write a script that automatically attacks them. If a
organization had a vulnerable application that could be exploited by this malicious 
hacker and this vulnerable application was installed on multiple computers, then we 
assume that an anomalous trace that only appeared once would not be malicious. 
Sometimes, applications may just go on an errant behavior either caused by a bug in 
the application or something else. These one time errant behaviors could cause an 
anomalous system call sequence to be thrown, however, it would not be a malicious 
sequence caused by a hacker.
mathematical model to generate a score that would increase if there is a higher 
likelihood of a malicious exploit and decrease if it is no
we also want to have our score to increase high for the initial few matches and then to 
increase less later on as more matches are found and there is diminishing returns. For 
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Figure 5.1: Internal Network Model 
 
 We want to be able to capture this reasoning in our 
t a malicious exploit. However, 
 
n 
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an enterprise data center that may have 100 or so server running the same program, 
we assume that either very few of the computers will be exploited or almost all the 
computers will be exploited. We don’t think we will see many cases where there are a 
medium number of exploits on potential targets. This is because a hacker will either do 
it manually and thus get very few targets since he has to do it by hand, or he will have a 
script and thus be able to attack all of them quickly. We believe this type of growth in the 
scoring model can be represented by a logarithmic graph. These graphs have a curve 
that first grows quickly with the first few numbers and then plateaus out near the end of 
the curve. By varying the base of the logarithmic function, we can change how steep the 
scoring curve should be on our heuristic. We chose a log base of 2 because it seemed 
to be a reasonable number for most enterprises with a couple dozen server computers. 
Larger companies with hundreds of computers may want to change their base to be a 
higher number like 10. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Log Plot Graph 
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HP, Z = log1 +                         (5.1) 
 
 
 
 
As the number of computers that contain an anomalous trace increases, there is greater 
likelihood that it is an exploit. In our algorithm we add 1 to the inner logarithm because 
we want to shift the curve to the left by one. In this way, if there is only 1 computer 
possessing an anomalous trace then it will be log(2) which is 1. We thought that the 
number 1 would be a good starting point for the equation.  
5.3 External Network Analysis 
 
When we think about the external network, we consider computers in other 
organizations that may be running the same application. For example, MySql is a 
commonly used application that can be deployed on multiple machines in many 
companies. If we again assume the advanced persistent threat model then we assume 
that a zero day exploit being used at one company is unlikely to be used at another. 
Therefore, by comparing traces from one company to another, we can gain a better 
understanding on whether a system call sequence is malicious or not. If only one 
company has experienced a system call sequence, but not any of the other companies, 
then we claim that increases the probability that the sequence is malicious. To express 
the relationship among the companies mathematically, we adopt a probabilistic model. 
 
 
i represents the number of 
internal computers that 
share a trace Z 
Let H(P, Z) represent the score that a 
network P has for a trace Z to determine 
whether it is anomalous or not 
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Figure 5.3: External Network Model 
 
First, we assume that the computers on the networks are sending their system 
call logs to the central monitoring system. This monitoring system should then be able 
to handle the processing of the logs. It compares traces from two computers by 
calculating a similarity score between their logs. If two computers have logs that are 
similar than they are more likely to share a random trace between the two of them. 
Different computers running an application may use the application for different 
purposes. By comparing the probability that a trace from one computer will be found in 
another computer we can help identify whether computers are running the same types 
of workloads. This probability score is calculated by counting the number of matches in 
computer A that are also in computer B divided by the total number of sequences in A. 
This will give us a future probability that any randomly anomalous sequence in A will be 
in B. As such we call this probability J(P, Q) with P and Q being computers that we are 
comparing to. For an internal network of computers we perform the summation of all the 
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computers running on the internal network running the same program. Then we take the 
J(P, Q) from all the external networks being compared and multiplicatively combine 
them together to get a total score Q(P, Z) to determine whether a trace is malicious or 
not. We use the information from all networks to help facilitate this calculation so that we 
have an optimal amount of information to make our judgments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We make a distinction between computers running on the same internal network 
and computers running on an external network by utilizing different techniques for each 
one and generating two different scoring values. In this way a security monitor can then 
compare the two values: Q(P, Z) and H(P, Z) to determine whether an anomalous trace 
Z is malicious or not. We consider a trace to be a sliding window of 1,000 system calls. 
If more than 30% of the system calls within that trace match up with another trace from 
another network then we consider that to be a match for the trace. 
 
J( P, Q ) = Probability that P has a trace in Q                 
Calculate J(P,Q) by looking at the number of traces that P has in 
common with Q to calculate a similarity score 
,  = 	
|	∩	|
||
                                    (5.2) 
 
 
Q(P, Z) = Probability that P has a trace Z which is malicious, given n 
networks 
                            ,  = 	∏ 1 −        (5.3) 
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5.4 Experimental Results 
 
To test our theory, we wanted to examine 3 relationships between traces to see how 
similar they are. The first relationship we test is whether the same application on 
multiple machines exhibits identical behavior that can be recorded to be similar. One 
potential issue is that applications have background noise that can interfere with the 
sequencing of the system calls. Some applications may have a lot of background noise 
to deal with while other applications may have less to deal with. If there is a lot of 
background noise, it may be difficult to generate a profile or to compare applications 
from different machines even if they are identical. We tested Tomcat server, Vsftpd 
server, and Unreal IRC server. We found that Tomcat server had some background 
noise, but that in general background noise did not deter the system call profiling much. 
Identical applications exhibited identical behavior that could be captured in a profile to 
be used for comparison. 
 The second relationship we tested was whether exploits exhibited the same 
system call traces when being run against applications. Again, we found that we could 
profile an application’s exploit consistently from machine to machine. It was again 
Tomcat’s background processes that could sometimes interfere to hinder the profiling, 
but only by a little 
 The third relationship we tested was how different exploits were from the normal 
behavioral profile of an application. For this we noticed that exploits could be created to 
be very similar to a behavioral profile or very different. Some exploits reproduced many 
valid system calls with just minor adjustments and were still able to succeed. Other 
exploits reproduced few valid system calls and produced many anomalous traces and 
were easier to detect. This goes to show that deciding upon a threshold for how many 
anomalous sequences in a trace should constitute a declaration of that trace as an 
exploit may be difficult for single host based anomaly detection systems. That is why 
our system that leverages multiple machines is more effective than a single machine 
running anomaly detection. 
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APPLICATION BEHAVIOR TO APPLICATION BEHAVIOR COMPARISON 
  
Figure 5.4: Comparison of a Tomcat trace to 2 other Tomcat Traces performing the same actions 
  
Figure 5.5: Comparison of a Vsftpd trace to 2 other Vsftpd Traces performing the same actions 
  
Figure 5.6: Comparison of an Unreal trace to 2 other Unreal Traces performing the same actions 
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APPLICATION EXPLOIT TO APPLICATION EXPLOIT COMPARISON 
  
Figure 5.7: Comparison of a Tomcat trace to 2 other Tomcat traces performing the same exploit 
  
Figure 5.8: Comparison of a Vsftpd trace to 2 other Vsftpd traces performing the same exploit 
  
Figure 5.9: Comparison of an Unreal trace to 2 other Unreal traces performing the same exploit 
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APPLICATION EXPLOIT TO APPLICATION PROFILE COMPARISON 
 
Figure 5.10: Comparison of a Tomcat exploit to the Tomcat normal behavioral profile 
 
Figure 5.11: Comparison of a Vsftpd exploit to the Vsftpd normal behavioral profile 
 
Figure 5.12: Comparison of an Unreal exploit to the Unreal normal behavioral profile 
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CHAPTER 6 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In summary, we have seen how system call tracing can be an additional tool in the 
security professional’s bag to examine their computing infrastructure for bugs. We have 
introduced The Triple Pot method for when one wants to set up a secure hosting 
environment for their enterprise server. Our method differs from prior approaches by 
analyzing multiple streams of system call data simultaneously. This method helps 
identify anomalous traces that are malicious and is able to classify benign traces as 
safe. In this way, we are able to achieve low rates of false positives so that computer 
administrators do not see an unreasonable number of reports of suspicious activity. We 
looked at multiple real life exploits and set up a test environment to verify and improve 
our initial model. By making certain assumptions about the hacker’s methodology, we 
can create a better defense against the Advanced Persistent Threat model. 
 In addition, we also looked at a separate model where multiple organizations 
may collaborate together to share information about their system call methods. Our 
method introduced a mathematical formula for indicating the likelihood that an 
anomalous trace was really a malicious exploit or just an errant run of the program. We 
also looked at how to compare traces from multiple organizations to generate a score 
for how likely a trace is an exploit. These two metrics can be used in conjunction with 
one another to help analyze computers for possible security violations. Our 
experimental results on the similarity of applications and exploits showed that it was 
possible for background processes to add noise to the profiling and tracing process that 
could obscure traces, however, this noise was often minimal and it seemed that valid, 
correct traces of program execution could be created.  
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 Host based intrusion detection is a topic that can still be greatly explored and the 
continuous streams of reports of new zero-day exploits make finding new methods to 
discover them more important than before.  
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